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Preface
This report is a summary compilation of the findings of STUK’s expert 
reviewers in the area of geosciences and the natural barrier to support 
STUK’s evaluation of Posiva’s Construction License Application (CLA) 
for the planned spent nuclear fuel repository at Olkiluoto.
The Core Group of reviewers has advised STUK over the period since the 
Decision in Principle to proceed with geological disposal of spent fuel at Olkiluoto. 
Members of the team have reviewed numerous documents developed by Posiva 
over the last decade or more, have made frequent visits to the ONKALO facility 
with STUK’s inspectors and have attended topical workshops at which issues 
have been discussed in detail with Posiva staff and expert contractors.
This latest round of review and evaluation has assessed the suite of documentation 
provided by Posiva in support of its TURVA Post-Closure Safety Case, which is 
a major component of its CLA, submitted in 2012. Each reviewer in the Core 
Group has assessed the documentation relevant to their own area of expertise, 
with considerable overlap between the reviewers. Reviewers compiled their 
own comments and findings in an identical template, developed by STUK.
This report consolidates and summarises the separate template reports. In the process, 
material has been significantly condensed and edited to provide a more readable 
Consolidated Review Report. Discussions between the Core Group members in May 
2014 allowed identification of the key issues arising, enabled common positions to be 
reached and facilitated the subsequent consolidation of comments and conclusions. 
The consolidation was carried out by the Key Consultant for the Natural Barrier 
area (Professor Neil Chapman) and the resulting report was approved by the other 
members of the Core Group. It thus represents a consensus view of this group.
The review work was supported by specialist evaluations in the fields of fractured 
rock hydrogeology, seismology, structural geology, hard rock construction and 
climate and glaciology. These expert reviewers assessed specific reports and 
subsequent workshops were held with Posiva on some of these topics to clarify 
issues. The findings and suggestions of these workshops, which were agreed between 
the specialist reviewers present, have been incorporated into this report.
CHAPMAN Neil, BATH Adrian, GEIER Joel, STEPHANSSON Ove. The disposal site and underground 
construction. STUK-TR 17. Helsinki 2015. 14 pp + 100 pp + 20 pp.
Keywords: radioactive waste, disposal of spent nuclear fuel, KBS-3 concept, bedrock geology, 
hydrogeology, hydrogeochemistry, paleohydrology, rock mechanics, fractured crystalline rock
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CHAPMAN Neil, BATH Adrian, GEIER Joel, STEPHANSSON Ove. Loppusijoituspaikka ja 
maanalainen rakennelma. STUK-TR 17. Helsinki 2015. 14 s + 100 s + 20 s.
Avainsanat: radioaktiivinen jäte, käytetyn ydinpolttoaineen loppusijoitus, KBS-3-konsepti, 
kallioperägeologia, hydrogeologia, hydrogeokemia, paleohydrologia, kalliomekaniikka, kiteinen 
rakoillut kallio
Tiivistelmä
Tämä raportti on yhteenveto Säteilyturvakeskuksen (STUK) käyttämien 
ulkopuolisten geotieteiden asiantuntijoiden arvioinneista, jotka teetettiin Posivan 
rakentamislupahakemuksen tarkastuksen yhteydessä STUKin oman arvioinnin tueksi. 
Työhön osallistunut arviointiryhmä on toiminut STUKin tukena Posivan käytetyn 
ydinpolttoaineen loppusijoituksen ensimmäisestä periaatepäätöksestä lähtien. Ryhmän 
jäsenet ovat arvioineet useita Posivan raportteja viimeisen kymmenen vuoden aikana, 
he ovat vierailleet Onkalossa useita kertoja STUKin tarkastajien kanssa ja he ovat 
osallistuneet useisiin STUK järjestämiin aiheeseen liittyviin työpajoihin, joissa 
arviointihavainnoista on keskusteltu Posivan ja Posivan konsulttien kanssa.
Viimeisimmällä arviointikierroksella ryhmä on keskittynyt Posivan TURVA-
raporttikokonaisuuteen (pitkäaikaisturvallisuus), joka on keskeinen osa vuonna 
2012 toimitettua rakentamislupahakemusta. Jokainen ryhmän jäsen on keskittynyt 
arviossaan omaan erikoisalueeseensa. Arviointihavainnot ja kommentit on kirjattu 
STUKin valmistelemaan arviointiraporttipohjaan.
Tämä raportti tiivistää ja vetää yhteen erillisten arviointiraporttien havainnot. 
Alkuperäisiä yksittäisten konsulttien arviointiraporttien tekstejä on tiivistetty ja 
editoitu, jotta yhteenvetoraportista on luettava kokonaisuus. Toukokuussa 2014 
järjestetyn työpajan keskusteluissa arviointiin osallistuneet asiantuntijat tunnistivat 
ja keskustelivat tärkeimmistä arviointihavainnoista. Yhteenvetoraportin on koonnut 
professori Neil Chapman, joka toimi STUKin avainkonsulttina paikkatutkimuksiin 
liittyvissä asioissa. Kaikki arviointiryhmän jäsenet ovat hyväksyneet raportin, joten se 
edustaa arviointiryhmän jäsenten näkemystä.
Arviointityöhön osallistui vakiojäsenten lisäksi erikoisosaajia seuraavilta aloilta: 
rakoilleen kallioperän hyrdogeologia, seismologia, rakenteellinen geologia, 
kalliorakentaminen, ilmasto ja jääkaudet. Nämä erikoisasiantuntijat arvioivat oman 
erityisalansa raportteja ja osallistuivat niiden aihealueista järjestettyihin työpajoihin, 
joissa tutkimushavainnoista keskusteltiin Posivan kanssa. Työpajoissa kirjatut 
havainnot ja ehdotukset on sisällytetty tähän yhteenvetoraporttiin.
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ACM
Alternative conceptual model
BFZ
Brittle fracture zone
BP
(years) before present (time)
CC/CCR
Complementary 
consideration (report: Posiva 
2012-11)
CLA
Construction License 
Application
CPM
Continuous porous medium
DBR
Design Basis Report: Posiva 
2012-03
DEM
Digital elevation model
DFN
Discrete fracture network 
(model)
DH
Deposition hole (for a spent 
fuel canister)
DOC
Dissolved organic carbon
DSM
Detailed-scale model (of 
geological structures)
DT
Demonstration tunnel
EBS
Engineered barrier system
ECPM
Equivalent continuous 
porous medium
EDZ
Excavation disturbed zone
EFPC
Extended full perimeter 
criterion (see FPI)
EPR
European pressurised reactor
EQ
Earthquake
FDB
Posiva fracture database
FEP
Features, events and 
processes
FPI
Full perimeter intersection 
(of a fracture, around the 
walls, floor and roof of a 
tunnel)
GCM
Global climate model
GPR
Ground penetrating radar
GSI
Geological strength index
HTU
Hydraulic testing unit
HZ
Hydrogeological (or 
hydraulic) zone (a major 
fracture zone hosting 
groundwater flow)
IZ
Influence zone (around a 
fault or fracture)
LDF/LDZ
Layout determining feature/
zone
LILW
Low and intermediate level 
radioactive waste
LVDT
Linear Variable Differential 
Transducer (cell, to measure 
rock stress) 
MDR
Models and Data Report 
(Posiva 2013-01)
MDZ
Minor deformation zone 
(equivalent radius >75 m and 
<564.2 m)
MIS
Marine Isotope Stage
Acronyms used in this report
This report uses many acronyms that are common in the field of 
geological disposal of radioactive wastes and several that are specific 
to Posiva’s license application or to this review programme.
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OLA
Operating License 
Application
OSD
Olkiluoto Site Description 
(Posiva 2011-02)
P-O
Prediction-Outcome 
tests in pilot boreholes 
and subsequent tunnel 
excavations
PA
Performance assessment
PAR
Performance Assessment 
Report: Posiva 2012-04
PAVE
Pressurised water sampling 
equipment, used in boreholes
PDF
Probability density function
PFDHA
Probabilistic fault 
displacement hazard analysis
PFL
Posiva Flow Log (tool)
PGF
Post-glacial faulting
PH
Pilot hole (drilled before 
excavation of an opening)
PSA
Probabilistic safety 
assessment
PSHA
Probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis
QA / QC
Quality assurance / quality 
control
RAI
Request (to Posiva) for 
additional information
RMD
Rock matrix diffusion
RMM
Rock mechanics model
RSC
Rock suitability classification 
(and RSC 2012 report: Posiva 
2012-24)
RQD
Rock quality designation
SCN
Sparse channel network
SCR
Stable continental regions
SDR
(Disposal) System 
Description report (Posiva 
2012-05)
SEM
Scanning electron microscopy 
(as used for characterisation 
of colloids)
SF
Spent fuel
SFR
Sparsely fractured rock 
(rock mass between large, 
conductive fractures)
SIS
Scandinavian ice sheet
SKB
Swedish Nuclear Fuel 
and Waste Management 
Company
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
TBM
Tunnel boring machine
TCF
Tunnel crossing feature
TCM
Tectonic continuum model
TERO
Termiset ominaisuudet 
(thermal properties) probe
tHM
Tonnes of heavy metal (as a 
measure of the mass of spent 
fuel)
THMC
Thermal, hydrogeological, 
mechanical, chemical 
(properties, behaviour, 
parameters)
UCS
Uniaxial compressive 
strength
UOPL
Underground Openings 
Production Line report 
(Posiva 2012-22)
VAHA
Posiva requirements 
management system
WR
(Posiva) Working Report
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Summary of the key issues affecting 
the construction license
Posiva has carried out a thorough and comprehensive programme of work to characterise 
the Olkiluoto site, both from the surface, using boreholes and drillcores, and in the 
ONKALO underground facility. The quality of the investigation work and the modelling 
and interpretation of its results is generally of a very high standard and, in many areas, 
represents the state-of-the-art in methodology and technology. The expert reviewers 
have been impressed by the totality of the work carried out by Posiva’s expert staff and 
contractors, and by their commitment to continue and improve both understanding and 
application during the construction phase. Our overall finding is that, if continued and 
completed as intended, the planned programme of work should deliver a high-quality 
facility to host the EBS and spent fuel, and all the geoscientific data necessary to support 
a successful safety case at the time of submission of an operating license application.
In a programme of this size and complexity it is inevitable that some areas 
require further work, that several are in a development stage that will 
require acquisition of more construction experience and that some still involve 
significant uncertainties that will need resolution. Identifying the areas 
and topics that have direct impact on STUK’s response to the Construction 
License Application (CLA) has been the main focus of this review.
The expert review group considers that none of the topics it has identified has such 
significance for the current safety case or for Posiva’s construction plans that it 
would prevent STUK from giving a positive safety appraisal. Nevertheless, these 
topics will need to be addressed by Posiva over the coming years – some of them 
before construction in the disposal rock volume should commence. The background 
to these topics and the detailed considerations on how to address them can be found 
in the main Sections of this report. This introductory Section brings them forwards 
within three Groups of suggested requirements and commitments for Posiva:
1. Before construction: Requirements to be met before underground construction 
(meaning excavation of disposal tunnels/panels/boreholes or drilling into the proposed 
disposal rock volume) or component fabrication (meaning manufacture of EBS 
components that will be used for spent fuel disposal) begins. The necessary tasks 
should be completed to an agreed schedule, with regular reporting to STUK.
2. Before operating licence application: Requirements for work that should be 
completed, or have sufficient progress made, with the outputs included in the Safety 
Case, Design, Operational and other materials in the OLA. There should be regular 
reporting to STUK in the period prior to the OLA.
3. Commitments to longer term RD&D. Programmes of work should be initiated/
continued to enhance and improve data and understanding about topics in the areas of 
Safety Case, Design and Operation, with progress reported regularly to STUK.
Whilst some matters in Group 2 need to be resolved before the OLA, the 
requirement of ‘sufficient progress’ can only be judged properly at the time of the 
OLA and it is consequently difficult to draw a clear line between Groups 2 and 3 
for some topics. There are certainly many areas where continued developments in 
the wider fields of science and engineering will improve our understanding and 
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affect considerations of how best to manage a geological repository. It thus seems 
inevitable that R&D will continue well beyond the start of the operational stage. 
For the current evaluation, we have thus not distinguished between Groups 2 and 
3, except to identify any specific tasks that should be completed before the OLA.
Group 1: Requirements before construction in the disposal volume begins
1. Target properties and VAHA: The current VAHA needs to be clarified and improved 
to the point that it can be used routinely to support design and site characterisation 
decisions. This will involve better definition of some of the design requirements 
and specifications at Levels 4 and 5 (including ensuring that parameters leading to 
fulfilment of long-term target properties can be measured reliably and routinely) and 
the development of change-control procedures. The traceability of some specifications 
is poor. Vague definitions need to be improved. Use of the words ‘low’ and ‘limited’ is 
unaccountable and not acceptable for regulatory purposes.
2. RSC utilisation: The RSC development and demonstration work is well-conceived 
but at an early and consequently immature stage. It should continue with high 
priority and be linked to the VAHA improvement work. Several specific issues require 
particular attention:
a. the tunnel and DH inflow criteria and the methodology to measure them: there are 
uncertainties surrounding the derivation and proposed measurement approaches 
and some clarification is needed before the CLA can be approved, even though it is 
recognised that it may be further updated in the early stages of construction;
b. whether there is a need to have RSC for the thermal properties of the rock, 
either at the deposition tunnel scale, or for individual DHs (lithological mapping, 
conductivity, anisotropy etc) and, if so, how and when these would be measured;
c. RSC measurement approach to qualifying the panel or tunnel-scale natural 
hydrochemical properties of the disposal volume in a disturbed environment;
d. systematic and integrated testing of tunnel floor EDZ characterisation methods 
so that a routine deployment procedure is ready for use in all deposition tunnels. 
Development of the procedure should include integration of GPR, geo-electrical 
and hydraulic tests so that a single measurement system/procedure can be selected 
for use as part of routine tunnel construction work. This development should be 
integrated with planning for routine tunnel floor scaling procedures. Posiva should 
consider including an EDZ factor in its RSC.
e. improvement of the value of data from the prediction-outcome technique;
f. an RSC deployment handbook for users. This should encompass the use and 
documentation of alternative layout options to be tested by the Panel Calculator. To 
avoid too much complexity with a multiplicity of parameters, the parameters to be 
varied in tests should be clearly stated.
Posiva should present a clear plan and procedures for the construction and 
operational management decision-making steps and hold-points, to which 
the RSC will provide one of the key inputs. STUK will then be able to match its 
inspection programme to these decision-points and will be clear about which 
information they need to assimilate. Particular attention needs to be placed onto 
the procedures that will be applied when significant uncertainties or marginal 
conditions are encountered in system properties, or where alternative construction 
or operational options are possible. The documentation should address:
a. issues such as how many deposition tunnels are to be constructed at one time and 
whether such decisions will affect the quality of RSC interpretations;
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b. how ‘hold points’ will be incorporated into the management system;
c. a time schedule for further ‘demonstration activities’ aimed at developing, testing and 
updating of the RSC Manual in the early stages of construction and to ensure that the 
activities described are at a sufficiently detailed level to capture the routine decisions 
that will have to be taken when characterising the rock and gathering RSC data;
d. management of situations where tests fail or are inconclusive, or require support by 
new or additional work;
e. a routine programme of hydrogeological testing and monitoring work that will be 
used once panel construction begins that will have the objective of validating and 
continuously improving and making more precise the models of groundwater flow 
at the scale of each panel and deposition tunnel, utilising state-of-the-art testing 
techniques and instrumentation;
f. a documented version of the Panel Calculator that can be evaluated and used as a 
basis for inspection.
It seems inevitable that an RSC toolkit that can be used routinely and 
with confidence should not be expected to be in place until a lot of ‘in-panel’ 
experience has been acquired. However, there are many loose ends and gaps 
at the present, and a complete and comprehensive RSC system does need to 
have been developed and tested repeatedly for reliability in the first deposition 
tunnels that are available in the period between the CL and the OLA.
3. Design adaptation and the construction process: Presentation of a strategy, 
plan and allocation of responsibilities for the design and construction decision-making 
procedures (possibly in the forthcoming ‘Management of the Disposal Concept’ 
document). Criteria and assessment procedures are needed for making decisions 
such as:
a. thermal dimensioning (currently based on average values for generalised rock-type 
groupings);
b. appropriate respect volumes (influence zones, IZ) around LDFs;
c. panel locations and deposition tunnel orientations;
d. choice of rock support systems in deposition areas, required stand-up times in each 
area of the repository and removal of the support system before backfilling;
e. use of the eastern site area;
f. whether to use a 2-storey design and, if so, how and when to decide on feasible 
depth, design and construction staging for the whole facility;
g. optimising disposal panel depths taking account of all critical safety, environmental 
and economic factors;
h. if/how Posiva intends to use the EUROCODE methodology to guide and control 
construction.
In addition, Posiva should present its plans for extending and retaining the pool of 
skilled geoscientists that will be required for the construction period, especially for the 
characterisation work and RSC application. Highly skilled and motivated geoscientists 
and engineers are working in this area today, but Posiva needs to consider the long-term 
availability of resources and the assurance of strength-in-depth over the next decades.
4. Rock stress regime: Posiva should present its plans for improving its current 
rock stress model and stress measurement database to a point that it is adequate 
to support the design decisions that will be used during construction and for the 
boundary conditions of the rock mechanics models. These plans, including campaigns 
of stress measurements, should be implemented as soon as further work begins at 
ONKALO.
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5. Enhanced hydrogeological characterisation and modelling of the deposition 
volume: The hydrogeological characterisation programme for further demonstration 
excavations and for the main construction phase needs significant work. An improved 
and state-of-the-art hydrogeological testing programme for all deposition areas 
(panel to DH scale) that includes routine head measurements and interpretation, and 
the extended testing and use of pilot holes is required. This programme should be 
demonstrated and tested in further work in the DTs and in the first few deposition 
tunnels, and should be integrated with the RSC development and design planning and 
decision-making strategy. Factors to be addressed are:
a. Resolving uncertainties about what the PFL tool is actually measuring (e.g. 
possible double counting of inflows; the meaning of the measurements in terms 
of the volume of rock or extent of the hydraulic network that is actually tested 
by the PFL along a given 20 m length of pilot hole). This work should include a 
scientific and engineering description of the design basis, operational protocols, 
testing and validation of the tool. The PFL is still a relatively novel measurement 
instrument that has only seen a limited scope of application – mainly by just two 
organizations, Posiva and SKB – with limited theoretical evaluation, laboratory 
testing and in situ validation, compared with more mature hydrogeological testing 
methods. Hence, it cannot yet be regarded as a robust, fully qualified measurement 
instrument. These uncertainties need to be explored and clarified by continued 
testing and verification of PFL results against other observations, as well as 
modelling of the measurement procedures and well-documented laboratory testing 
under controlled conditions. The output of this work should clearly identify and 
quantify the uncertainties in data measurement and interpretation: these should 
be related specifically to each of the individual measurement campaigns in critical 
surface and pilot boreholes that have been used as the principal sources of data 
to calibrate the Hydro-DFN model. In the short-term, POSIVA could quantify the 
uncertainties in interpretation of the PFL and HTU tests.
b. The Hydro-DFN development is complex and hard to trace through the 
documentation, with many analysis procedures and implementation techniques 
that have been developed ad hoc in the course of the site descriptive model 
development and subsequent application. A concise and systematic summary 
description of the whole DFN conceptual framework and its implementation, plus 
its applications, is required.
c. A planned programme of measurements is needed that will (i) lead to better 
validation of the limited DFN ‘predictive’ capability for spatial utilisation, (ii) 
gather the most appropriate data necessary to qualify DHs and tunnels, (iii) test 
alternative conceptual frameworks for flow in the rock mass and (iv) continuously 
improve confidence in the DFN model and its results, as applied to PA and the 
qualification of near-field rock. For example, the area density (intensity) of inflows 
to the tunnels, when compared to the pilot borehole inflows for the same rock, is 
a key measurement for reducing the uncertainty in any discrete network model. 
Although Posiva has recently demonstrated an approach for obtaining water 
leakage mapping data that could be useful, the link between field observations and 
model validation has yet to be made.
d. If slow saturation and lack of full saturation throughout the thermal period has 
safety consequences, it is clear that more work will need to be done with respect to 
very low hydraulic conductivity rock volumes. The key uncertainties continue to be 
the actual range of k for the rock mass at the low value end of the spectrum and 
the volumetric proportion of such values, the likelihood of tunnel-floor EDZ inflows 
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to DHs and the tunnel inflow estimates to DHs, if a less connected network of flow 
channels exists. Posiva has not dealt convincingly with the uncertainties that they 
already recognise, which means that calculated distributions of DH saturation 
times is not quantitatively convincing.
e. A major gap at present is in gathering head data, which can be highly informative. 
Heads are readily measured, although they will be highly variable and will 
change with time, and many measurements will be needed to evaluate the system 
probabilistically.
f. A plan to verify the hydrogeological model for the near-field rock. This may require 
instrumenting the existing boreholes to measure heads and also to do ‘blind’ 
predictions before construction of each tunnel and boring of DHs. A probabilistic 
approach to developing and evaluating predictions is essential in order to produce 
meaningful tests of the Hydro-DFN model. This should also be done with the 
Geo-DFN model, focusing on predicting and measuring the properties that are 
of primary concern for successful application of the RSC (principally fracture 
intensity and extent).
g. An alternative conceptual model (ACM) exists of groundwater flow in the fracture 
network and how this might be channelled. Different assumptions about the shape 
of flow paths (e.g. expressed as fracture wetted surface or flow channel aspect ratio) 
and their connectivity lead to the possibility of more ‘dry’ DHs, increased ‘spot’ 
flow rates in channels in the near field (e.g. in DHs or in disposal tunnel walls) and 
smaller wetted surface areas (reducing the critical ‘F’ factor used in radionuclide 
transport calculations, e.g. by ×10). This could affect the results of PA release 
calculations. This ACM should be explored alongside Posiva’s current Hydro-DFN 
model, which has a more limited type of channelling within fractures that are 
generated based on the DFN conceptual model.
Posiva should make a thorough and wide-ranging review of its 
hydrogeological programme and reconsider the related parts of its 
RSC programme before it starts major excavation work.
6. Monitoring: The overall monitoring programme should be developed, improved and 
made more precise. It should be integrated with the RSC measurements that will be 
made and to monitoring work already in place (e.g. geodetic, GPS). Gaps in the factors 
being monitored should be filled (e.g. micro-seismicity; groundwater heads; trace 
elements in groundwater as indicators of anomalous conditions; microbiology). Clearer 
definitions and justifications of both action levels and tolerated amounts of critical 
materials should be presented. Response actions should be better defined. A reporting 
and inspection programme should be developed and agreed with STUK.
Groups 2 & 3: Requirements before and commitments beyond the OLA
1. Progressive reduction of uncertainties in key parameters/models: A strategy 
and plan should be presented for the continued and progressive reduction of critical 
uncertainties in fracture network, groundwater flow and chemistry characteristics 
during the construction period and in preparation for the OLA. The strategy should 
address at least the following topics:
a. verification of models of redox conditions in disposal volume groundwaters;
b. verification of models of the interaction of sulphide, methane, DOC and microbial 
activity in undisturbed and excavation-disturbed environments;
c. verification of pore water / fracture water salinity diffusion behaviour and matrix 
diffusion history;
12
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d. improvement of and rectification of problems in the Geo-DFN model;
e. improvement of databases on fracture size and transmissivity relationships;
f. identification of present-day groundwater discharge areas.
2. Fracture response to heat and seismicity: The large-scale thermal response of 
the rock mass from repository to ground surface is not well understood and there is no 
analogous experience in heating such a large body of rock at relatively shallow depth. 
It is possible that stress changes could shift some fractures out of their stability fields, 
causing shear movements. This could happen at any scale, from ‘critical fractures’ (in 
the earthquake canister shear scenario) to large brittle fracture zones (BFZ). In the 
latter case, small to medium magnitude earthquakes could affect the repository and 
any surface nuclear facilities that are present on the whole Olkiluoto site in the first 
decades to 1000 years after disposal. Posiva is starting a programme to characterise 
large BFZ properties in more depth, to help scope this issue. New modelling 
techniques are coming available to study the possible dynamic impacts on the rock 
mass and fracture system. It is not expected that this scenario would lie outside the 
bounds of the earthquake scenario already studied by Posiva, but it could occur much 
earlier.
Posiva appreciates this is an important area and has an impressive forward 
programme on several, but not all, key topics. Continued work is needed on an 
integrated thermal and mechanical model of fracture strain at all scales in and 
around the repository (see Group 1, above). This should fully integrate work on 
thermal fracture activation and the response of the fracture network to major 
earthquakes. The work should be closely integrated with the development 
of the stress model for the repository volume. Both modelling studies and 
characterisation of fracture properties at all scales should be included.
The seismic hazard work should be continued and should investigate: the geometry 
and stability of major BFZs at, around and below the site, including offshore; 
neotectonic data from LIDAR and other tools; geodetic and GPS monitoring; 
the scaling of earthquake magnitudes and frequencies under current and post-
glacial conditions, including focal mechanism analysis for the stress modelling; 
the derivation of critical fracture sizes related to the RSC programme.
The central point is that Posiva needs to take a fresh approach to post-closure seismic 
hazard analysis and should take the opportunity of developing this new approach 
alongside the planning of its operational PSHA for the repository and its surface 
facilities. A seismologically informed approach is needed that integrates the following:
a. knowledge about how EQs initiate and propagate in the shallow and mid-crust in this 
SCR geological environment;
b. deterministic studies of specific BFZ behaviour scenarios in and around the site, using 
the latest lineament data and deep geophysical profiling of BFZ geometry that maps 
the deeper (>1000 m) structure of BFZs at the site;
c. observational evidence from LIDAR studies complemented with digital elevation 
models (DEM) of the bedrock surface;
d. strain budget modelling based on GPS data, EQ fault-plane solutions and in situ 
stress measurements;
e. probabilistic assessment of fracture and fault displacements (PFDHA) throughout the 
rock volume at site scale that assesses distributed displacements, triggered faulting, 
depth variation in displacements etc;
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f. rock mechanical analysis building on discrete element modelling with the 3DEC 
approach and novel techniques, such as particle flow (PFC) modelling;
g. the combined impacts on target fractures of rock heating during the thermal period 
and induced EQ activity on fracture zones in and around the repository, where ongoing 
work by SSM indicates that large target fracture displacements could occur.
This degree of integration will require planning that incorporates Posiva’s 
already impressive future work programme (e.g. on ice load and thermal 
stability of BFZs). STUK should request an outline of these plans that 
details work during the period between the CLA and the OLA.
The calculation of probability-weighted multi-canister failure releases is difficult 
to follow and, in future, Posiva should provide a more extended description of 
how this is assembled. The description should include an assessment of the 
impact of an order of magnitude increased frequency over the deglaciation 
period. It would also be valuable for Posiva to compile the information to 
identify if, where and how it sees its analysis as being conservative.
A specific study that is required in the near future is the evaluation of an EQ on one of 
the Eurajoensalmi bay BFZ structures associated with BFZ214. This should look at the 
Mmax that could be associated with these structures under current conditions, informed 
by regional assessments such as SHARE and Posiva’s own evaluation of the stress field, 
and under post-glacial conditions. The output of this should be a better justification for 
the choice of critical fracture radius and a sensitivity study showing how critical fracture 
radius is affected by parameters such as M, seismogenic BFZ distance (and whether 
the BFZ is lateral to or below the repository), stress orientation etc. This seems an 
essential input to further development of the RSC, hence its suggested early delivery.
3. Further experimental studies in the disposal volume: four topics have emerged 
where additional, new experimental studies, in the actual repository volume, could 
assist in uncertainty reduction:
h. verification of the impact of excavation and pumping disturbances on the 
development of redox, sulphur and microbial characteristics of near-field 
groundwaters during the operational and immediate post-closure periods;
i. repeating POSE-type experiments in different rock types (mineralogy, foliation, 
stress patterns etc) that are more relevant to those of the disposal rock volume, to 
assess the extent to which these factors could affect spalling, spalling dimensions, 
transmissivity and retention properties and thus constrain choice of deposition 
volumes and their long-term safety;
j. characterisation of the strength and hydraulic properties of fracture zones at 
different scales, up to site-scale BFZs:
k. testing of silica gel grouting technology and results.
4. Dilute water penetration: Global climate models indicate a possibility that there 
could be continuation of current temperate conditions for a considerable period of 
time – at least several tens and possibly some hundreds of thousands of years. The 
deep groundwater system will be progressively flushed with dilute meteoric waters, 
replacing brackish waters in fractures at disposal depth during this period. Dilution of 
groundwater salinity around deposition holes through the period of temperate climate, 
continuing due to melt water infiltration in a subsequent period of glaciation, could 
affect the stability of the buffer (to chemical erosion). Posiva says such conditions can 
give rise to large numbers of canister failures, depending, in particular, on the matrix 
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diffusion depth assumed in modelling. Clearing up uncertainties over the rate and 
history of interaction of rock mass pore waters and water in fractures would help 
to decide whether this is a possibility. A parallel point is that Posiva’s conservative 
assumption of little dispersion in the fracture network for radionuclide transport is 
non-conservative if used in a reverse sense to evaluate penetrating dilute waters (as 
they ‘see’ less rock en route to depth).
5. Climate change impacts: Posiva has focussed its safety case by ‘repeating’ the 
Weichselian glacial cycle over the next c.150,000 years, after an interglacial period. 
Further studies for inclusion in the OLA should explore the sensitivity of the safety 
case to different possible timings and magnitudes of climate periods, including:
l. prolonged temperate conditions (>50,000 years);
m. earlier/later/longer onset of permafrost;
n. earlier/later onset of glacial conditions with justified minimum and maximum 
values of ice thickness and residence time;
o. possible rapid or abrupt climate changes in the next few hundreds or thousands of 
years affecting groundwater recharge, sea-level etc.
6. LILW cavern: The CLA includes a shallow LILW disposal cavern accessed from the 
SF repository ramp. It is located directly above parts of the SF repository and contains 
substantial volumes of cement. A separate safety case has been presented recently 
for this cavern facility (Posiva 2012-37) but has not been reviewed. A fully integrated 
assessment for the whole disposal facility should be required as part of the OLA, using 
common evolution scenarios and common approaches to modelling groundwater flow 
and chemistry. This will need to assess any potential for impacts of the LILW cavern 
on the SF repository and vice versa (e.g. cement chemical impacts on the SF repository 
and large-scale thermal rock strain impacts on the LILW repository) and evaluate 
integrated radionuclide release/transport and potential doses. It is understood that 
STUK has requested further information on Posiva’s intentions for such work.
